Dr Ghassan Elkahlout is Director of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies in Doha and Associate Professor of Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. His research focuses on mediation, humanitarian diplomacy and post-conflict recovery. He is Chief Editor of the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development and has published widely in leading academic journals. His most recent book is Gulf to Global: The Rise of Qatar in Conflict Mediation, which examines State-led mediation practices and diplomatic innovation in contemporary conflicts.
Qatar has mediated in several highly sensitive contexts. In your analysis, what has been Qatar’s role and approach regarding mediation between parties to armed conflict?
Qatar has developed a distinctive mediation practice over the past two decades, characterized by sustained engagement, a pragmatic willingness to maintain channels with all parties to an armed conflict, and the integration of diplomatic, humanitarian and economic resources. This is documented in detail in Gulf to Global: The Rise of Qatar in Conflict Mediation. Article 7 of Qatar’s Constitution establishes the peaceful resolution of international disputes as a foreign policy priority, and this has been operationalized through dedicated institutional structures within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including expanded ministerial roles and a team of Special Envoys and senior officials working on mediation files.
In practice, Qatar’s approach rests on several interconnected pillars. The first is the maintenance of strong partnerships without exclusive alignments, which creates room to manoeuvre and gives access to parties that other mediators cannot reach. Maintaining relationships with non-State armed groups [NSAGs], including those designated as terrorist organizations by certain States, has been a source of both criticism and effectiveness. This access has often enabled breakthroughs when other channels were exhausted.
The second pillar is the integration of humanitarian and development support into diplomatic strategy. Qatar does not pursue mediation in isolation from reconstruction commitments, development finance and humanitarian assistance. Addressing the consequences of conflict, such as displacement, economic collapse and weak institutions, is understood as part of the diplomatic effort. The existing link between its mediation and humanitarian diplomacy has been viewed as a distinctive feature of Qatar’s regional positioning.
The third pillar is institutional investment. Qatar’s mediation has evolved from the high-level personal diplomacy of its early efforts toward greater institutional sophistication, operational infrastructure for monitoring implementation, and a willingness to co-mediate alongside other States and multilateral bodies. One lesson that emerges clearly from this experience is that diplomatic infrastructure, including the relationships, trust and communication channels built over the years, cannot be improvised in a crisis. It must be developed and maintained long before it is needed.
I should note that these questions rightly focus on the intersection of mediation and international humanitarian law [IHL], so I will address the remaining questions from a broader analytical perspective rather than focusing narrowly on any single State’s mediation practice.
Do you think that compliance with international law can help build confidence between the parties to an armed conflict and thus contribute to mediation efforts?
Compliance with IHL can function as a direct enabler of mediation. This is a point that deserves greater attention in both mediation practice and scholarship.
One of the most persistent obstacles in protracted armed conflicts is the absence of trust between parties. Years of violence, broken commitments and perceived bad faith create an environment in which even modest agreements become difficult to reach. In such contexts, demonstrated compliance with IHL, or concrete steps toward it, can serve as a confidence-building mechanism. When a party to a conflict shows that it is capable of restraint, that it can honour commitments regarding the treatment of civilians or detainees, or that it will facilitate humanitarian access, it sends a signal that broader political commitments may also be honoured.
Considering the logic of humanitarian pauses and ceasefires, these arrangements typically involve specific commitments that correspond to issues regulated under IHL: the cessation of hostilities in defined areas, the facilitation of humanitarian aid, the evacuation of the wounded, or arrangements related to detainees. When such commitments are implemented – however imperfectly – they create a baseline of demonstrated compliance that can inform more ambitious negotiations. Each instance of honouring an arrangement generates a degree of confidence, however tentative, that underpins the next step.
Conversely, when parties commit serious violations of IHL and act with a sense of impunity, the political space for negotiation contracts dramatically. Public opinion hardens, domestic constituencies become less willing to accept compromise, and the human costs of the conflict generate demands for accountability that can complicate peace processes. Serious violations of IHL, in addition to often leading to humanitarian catastrophes, can complicate mediation and the implementation of interim agreements.
There is also a temporal dimension worth highlighting. IHL compliance can build confidence at different stages of a conflict. In the early phases, when violence is intense and trust is minimal, even small acts of compliance, such as allowing a humanitarian corridor, facilitating a medical evacuation or permitting the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] to access detainees, can create openings for dialogue. In middle phases, when mediation is under way but fragile, compliance with interim arrangements demonstrates good faith and sustains political momentum. In later phases, when agreements are being implemented, continued compliance reassures parties that have taken political risks by agreeing to compromise. At each stage, the mediator’s task is to identify where compliance can do the most work and to create the conditions for it.
Underpinning this is a broader insight about humanitarian diplomacy. Integrating humanitarian considerations from the outset of mediation, rather than treating them as peripheral concerns to be addressed after political settlements are reached, establishes trust between parties who may have no other basis for engagement. Conflicts do not pause for humanitarian corridors to be negotiated separately from political settlements. The protection of civilians, the delivery of aid, the evacuation of the wounded and the release of detainees create tangible outcomes that sustain momentum when political progress stalls. When respect for IHL is woven into the fabric of the mediation process from the beginning, it becomes a confidence-building mechanism. Likewise, it demonstrates that negotiation can deliver results.
I would add an important note here, which is that compliance with IHL alone does not produce peace, and insisting on full legal accountability as a precondition for negotiation can itself become an obstacle to reaching agreements that save lives in the near term. This does not mean that accountability and mediation are mutually exclusive: in several post-conflict transitions, including Colombia’s peace process, which culminated in the signing of the 2016 Colombian peace accord, accountability mechanisms were sequenced alongside the negotiated settlements rather than demanded as a prior condition. Rather, it demonstrates that the question is more often on when and how to introduce accountability without foreclosing the political space needed for an agreement. The challenge for mediators is to encourage adherence to humanitarian norms as a means of building the trust necessary for political progress, without allowing legal questions to paralyze the negotiation process. This requires considerable diplomatic skill and contextual sensitivity. There is no formula for guaranteed success in this domain; the negotiation process demands action informed by deep understanding of the specific conflict dynamics at play....
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