Executive summary
On 12 October 2026, former President Joseph Kabila announced the creation of the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (Front for the Refoundation of the Nation, FRN), which he leads, in Goma, North Kivu. The move dissolved the Alliance Fleuve Congo (Congo River Alliance, AFC) political coalition and incorporated its political and military structures, including those of its primary armed constituent, the March 23 Movement (M23), although the FRN's founding declaration does not specify M23's own status. The FRN pledged to 'put an end to tyranny by any means necessary, including the use of force'. In a subsequent communiqué, FRN Secretary-General Freddy Kaniki noted that the FRN inherits all of the AFC's 'rights, obligations and commitments', particularly under the Doha peace process. The aim of overthrowing the government predates the FRN; in April 2026, the United States Department of the Treasury had already described the AFC as seeking 'regime change in Kinshasa'. Under a former head of state, the FRN turns an eastern rebellion with national aims into a declared national challenge to Kinshasa.
The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accused Kabila of formalizing a 'general attack' against the Republic and suspended the activities of 13 political parties linked to Kabila and opposition allies. Belgium condemned his resort to armed force, while the African Union (AU), without naming him, restated its rejection of power being taken by force. Both reaffirmed their support for the existing diplomatic tracks. Kinshasa has not closed the Doha channel, but has narrowed its reading of the process to security and technical issues. This assessment examines the implications of Kabila's move and sets out three possible trajectories: a narrowed Doha process, a prolonged negotiation freeze accompanied by political hardening, or military escalation towards the Katanga region.
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