Executive Summary
The return of Donald Trump to the White House for a second term in January 2025 has led to a decisive shift in US policy towards Afghanistan. While the Biden administration never formally recognised the Taliban regime, it maintained humanitarian aid and cautiously sustained contact with the Taliban leaders and representatives through facilitated dialogues and meetings in third countries such as Qatar. Trump's “America First" foreign policy has reversed this posture.
Within the first 90 days of its term, the Trump administration halted USAID's programming in Afghanistan, cutting approximately $1.8 billion in aid. By March 2025, it had eliminated 83% of USAID's contracts. As a result, humanitarian agencies operating in Afghanistan began suspending operations, leaving millions of Afghans without essential food, healthcare, or protection services. Aid from the United States, formerly the single largest source of support, has all but disappeared, exacerbating the socioeconomic and service delivery challenges in Afghanistan.
The ideological reorientation under Trump towards 'America First' policies means Afghanistan no longer features prominently in US global priorities. Rather than supporting long-term stabilisation and state building in Afghanistan, Washington's engagement is now primarily reactive, focusing narrowly on aspects of counterterrorism and hostage recovery. This hands-off approach has created both challenges and opportunities for the Taliban leaders, particularly in recalibrating their regional diplomacy.
In the absence of Western recognition or developmental support, the Taliban's government, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), has sought to build a web of regional relationships to compensate for the financial and political vacuum that US-led Western disengagement has left in place. However, these efforts have met mixed results. Relations with Pakistan – once seen as the Taliban's closest ally – have become frosty as Islamabad has accused the Taliban of harbouring Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has conducted airstrikes in Afghan territory and continues to deport significant numbers of Afghan refugees, further straining bilateral relations and overwhelming Afghan authorities.
Simultaneously, Taliban-Iran relations have been tested by the mass forced return of Afghans from Iran, often under abusive conditions, and the implications of war between Iran and Israel. Nonetheless, pragmatic cooperation between Tehran and Kabul persists, among others, because of mutual economic interests and shared concerns over regional instability.
In Central and South Asia, the Taliban has enjoyed warmer, though still informal, relations with countries like Uzbekistan and India. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to formally recognise the IEA, a development more likely driven by Moscow's geopolitical posturing than by meaningful bilateral alignment. The practical benefits of this recognition remain to be seen. While withholding a formal recognition of the Taliban's government, China welcomed an official Taliban envoy in January 2025 to lead the Afghan diplomatic mission in Beijing. Despite Taliban's regional outreach, including several business deals signed with Chinese companies, no transformative economic partnerships or infrastructural investments have materialised, and Afghanistan remains largely isolated from global financial institutions.
The Trump administration's consideration of Afghanistan as a low policy priority is unlikely to change unless major geopolitical developments force it to alter course. Any expectations that Trump will pursue significant policy modifications or reclassify Afghanistan as a priority within foreign policy considerations appear unrealistic.
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